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1. Introduction 
Traditional economic theory treats families as a single 
unit with a combined "household" utility function. More 
recently, economists have recognized that a family can 
usefully be described by assuming that each member maximizes 
an individual utility function. Becker [2] models the 
II gratefully acknowledge the assistance of David James 




process of mate selection by individuals and describes 
behavior of family members seeking to maximize output of 
family-produced commodities. Other authors investigate the 
role of individual bargaining in allocating household goods 
{Manser and Brown [7], McElroy and Horney [6]. Pollak [8] 
emphasizes the role of transaction costs in the decision to 
marry, likening marriage to the merger of private firms. 
This paper extends the new theory of marriage, 
especially that developed by Becker, by examining the effect 
that sharing of family output has on individual family 
member incentives. This paper models. techniques used by 
families to assure proper member behavior and, in 
particular, the role of love as an enforcement tool. The 
model suggests a number of testable implications which 
provide fertile ground for future research. 
: 
II. A Model of Family Allocation of Time 
In the new theory of marriage, two individuals choose to 
marry if output produced by a couple exceeds that of the sum 
of individual outputs. More generally, a family (F) chooses 
to accept a mate (M) if the increase in production or 
utility from doing so exceeds the compensation to the mate 
plus appropriate transaction and enforcement costs. This 
formulation allows for extended families which arrange a 
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marriage and expect the spouse (or spouses) to live with and 
contribute productive effort to the family. 2 
An individual can devote time to production of household 
goods, shared among family members, or can devote time to 
production of own goods, consumed only by the individual. 3 
Household goods are produced using inputs of time from both 
M and F, p=p(m ,f ).4 The function P is measured in some p p
common unit of value.! The share of the household good P 
allocated to M is given by s, the remainder of which goes to 
F. Positive but diminishing marginal value products of both 
time inputs is assumed, as is a diminishing marginal rate of 
substitution between time inputs. 
Production of own goods is a function of individual time 
inputs. Y is the value of goods produced by F for F, 
Y=Y(f )' and X is the value of goods produced by M for M,y
x=x(m }. positive but diminishing marginal value product is x
assumed for both functions. 
2Each spouse in a childless two-person marriage can be 
considered both "family" and "spouse". Such a situation 
raises some interesting questions about the symmetry of 
misbehavior, enforcement, and love. 
30ne good produced with an individual's time and 
consumed by an individual is leisure. 
4More formally, inputs and outputs are each vectors 
representing the variety of uses of time and the variety of 
value-producing outputs. 
!Becker and others use a production function where time 
and other inputs produce goods which are then combined into 
one composite household good. The use of value functions 
here allows time to be allocated to both individual and 
household goods and is equivalent to the indirect utility 




Value to the family is given by the following function: 
(a) V
f
= (l-s)P + Y 
Assume the share s is determined by the family. For 
reasons evident later, let share s be a function of 
parameter z which the family actually chooses, s=s(z). The 
function has a maximum (s' '<0) at s=l and a minimum (s' '>0) 
at s=O. For convenience, s=o when z=O and s=l when z=l.' 
Alternatively, share may be determined from some bargaining 
process between M and F or may be determined by the market. 
In these latter two cases, s is exogenous, although the 
conclusions of the model are unaffected. 
If F controls distribution of P and controls time 
allocations by M, F maximizes the above equation with 
respect to z, m ' m ' f ' and f • The function isx p y p 
constrained by total time available to M and F and is 
constrained because F must assure that M receives income 
at least equal to that available in another marriage,' 
sP+X~I. The constrained maximization equation for the 
family can be written as the following: 
'The cubic function s(z)=-2z3+3x2 satisfies these 
conditions as does the sine function and any number of B­
splines of order two. 
'The cost of divorce is not explicitly considered here. 
Either I is net of divorce cost or this is a calculation 
made before marriage. An additional note: the next best 





(b) Vf = (l-s)P + Y - Al (mp+my-M) 
- A2(fp+f y-F) + A3 (X+SP-I) 
If the compensation constraint I is binding, M receives 
compensation equal to the best alternative and the 
maximization problem is solved using A3>O. Omitting the 
constraint equations, the first order conditions are the 
following: 
(c)	 aVf = - ~ + A ~ = 03 
as az az 
av f =(e)	 (l-s)lf- - Al + A3(s)~ = 0 
amp amp amp 
( f )	 av f = = 0 
af y 
av f = (g)	 (l-s)lf- - A2 + A3(s)~ = 0 
af af afp p	 p 
The multipliers Al and A2 are the marginal values to F 
of additional time for M and F, respectively. That A <A2I 
implies M's time is less valuable to the family than is F's 
time.' A3 is the marginal cost to F at equilibrium of an 
'Not surprisingly, implying that a family may be 
uninclined to spend resources on extending the life of a 
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increase in the alternative income 1 to M. Given that A3>O 
and assuming sand P are positive, A3 must equal one. The 
marginal cost to F of an increase in 1 by one dollar is one 
dollar, the amount F's income falls. 
A sufficiently large aVf/af or small aVf/af wouldp x 
induce F to devote all available time to production of 
household goods; "1 simply have no time to myself." Similar 
.conditions would make F require M to devote all time to 
household production.' Opposite conditions could induce F 
to give all time to own 2roduction. 
Since A3=1, conditions (d) and (e) simplify to the 
following: 







( i ) - + = 0 
amp 





The left side of this equation is the slope of an 
oisovalue curve from the function vf(mx,m ' • • .)p = Vf ' 
mate compared to extending F's life. This would include the 
whole range of health care expenditures. 
'Becker [2, p. 15] outlines in detail the conditions
 




holding other inputs to value constant. At equilibrium, the 
slope of this functions equals the slope of M's time 
constraint. If M can costlessly substitute time between the 
two activities, the budget line's slope .is -1. 
Figure 1 shows that the graphical solution is similar to 
mp
 
Figure 1. Value Maximization for F
 
III. If the Income Constraint is not Binding 
If F is compelled to pay M the income M would receive 
outside the marriage, the income constraint (I) is binding 
and the maximization equation is solved using A3>O. The 
alternative is when the income constraint is not binding. 
The alternative income is lower than the compensation F 
chooses to allow M to receive. In this case, F's 
maximization is solved using A3=O. Omitting the constraint 
equations, the first order conditions become the following: 
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aVf(k)	 = -~ = 0 
as az 




(m)	 = (l-s)ll.- - Al = 0 
amp amp 
aVf(n) = ay = 0- '"2 
af afy y 
aVf =(0)	 (l-s)ll.- - A2 = 0 
af afp	 p 
The results of these conditions might be described as 
the pure exploitation case. Assuming positive output of the 
household good, condition (k) is true when S'=0.10 For a 
maximum, the second derivative of condition (k) must be less 
than zero, implying that s">O. This is true when z=O and 
s=O. 'In other words, M receives no share of household
• 
goods. Because "'1=0, F requires that M work until the 
marginal value of additional time equals zero. Combining 
conditions (1) and (m) yields aP/amp=O, showing that Fuses 
M's time until additional time yields no additional 
household goods. M is permitted to use any remaining time 
for production of own goods. 
10Because the special function s(z) is used, it is 




M would not voluntarily choose this alternative since M 
receives greater income by remaining single. If single, M 
can devote all time to production of own goods, rather than 
using some time for production of household goods of which 
no share is received. This alternative only appears, 
therefore, in a situation where single living does not 
occur. 
By contrast, the family prefers this alternative. The 
family is not constrained by Mis compensation. In fact, the 
family gains to the extent it can reduce the available 
alternative income to M, especially if the alternative 
income is eliminated as a constraint. We would expect 
cultures with-this system to be characterized by marriages 
arranged without the consent of at least one spouse, 
household labor strictly enforced by the family, prohibition 
of voluntary divorce, and prohibition of voluntary single 
living. 
IV. Conflicting Incentives 
In the theory of firm,ll individuals earn higher income 
by allowing themselves to be organized by an entrepreneur in 
llThe vast literature on this subject is represented by 
A1chian and Demsetz [1]. Applied voluntary organizations, 
the literature is summarized by Sandler and Tschirhart [9]. 
Cheung [4] models family size and marriage contracts using 
the theory of the firm. Most similar to the family 
production here, Cheung [5] also examines the problem of 
conflicting incentives in share tenancy contracts. 
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a way that reduces otherwise considerable transaction costs. 
Such an arrangement also allows exploitation of economies of 
scale and promotes gains from specialization. One important 
restraint on the gain from forming a firm is the cost of 
monitoring and enforcing appropriate behavior by workers. 
Overall, workers have higher income because they are 
organized in firms, but once organized in firms, each worker 
has an incentive to shirk assigned responsibilities and so 
increase individual utility. Managers use a variety of 
techniques to assure appropriate worker behavior. 
Because a family member only receives a share 12 of the 
output produced with that individual's time, the family 
member may have different preferences than those of the 
family.13 If M could choose own time allocations freely, M 
would maximize the following function with respect to m andx 
m • M is assumed to take the share of household goods s asp 
given. 
(p) = sP + X - A(m +m -M)
p Y 
Omitting the constraint equations, the first order 
conditions are the following: 
12The case of household public goods, which are consumed 
equally and fully by all family members is considered later. 
13Becker [2, p. 15] acknowledges this problem, but his 




aV( q) m = ax - A = 0 
am amx x 
aV •(r)	 m sap - A = 0 
amp amp 
The margina~ value to M of additional time for M is A. 
Notice that A is i~ general not equal to Al from 
maximization for F. The value of M's time is different for 
M than for F. 
The above conditions in turn imply the following: 
(s)	 ax 





Once ag~in, the left side of this equation is the slope 
of an isovalue curve from the function vm(mx,m ) = v~. Atp 
equilibrium, the slope of this functions equals the slope of 
M's time constraint. If M can costlessly substitute time 
between the two activities, the budget line's slope is -1. 
This equation would b~ identical to maximization for F 
were it not for the presence of the share term s. The 
equilibrium marginal rate of substitution between time 
inputs is different for M because M receives only a share of 
the household good P. M chooses less time for household 
production than is preferred by the family. In order to 
achieve a slope equal to (minus) one in condition (s), the 
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numerator must be smaller than for condition (j), implying 
smaller marginal value product of own production time and so 
more time given to own production. Likewise, the marginal 
value product of time for household must be larger for 
condition (s) than for (j), so less time is given to 
household production. 
The time inputs of M preferred by M are different than 
those preferred by F for any distribution of household goods 
other than giving all of them to M, (s=l).- This suggests 
that there is a temptation to shirk regardless of the agreed 
distribution of household goods. The temptation will 
persist despite changes in the distribution. Thus, a change 
in distribution cannot be used to "bribe" M into behaving 
properly. 
Figure 2 compares the isovalue graphs for M and F. 
~ Vmlmx,mp ) = V~ 
~_ ~Vm(mx,mp) = 
Figure 2. Comparing M and F Choices 
Notice that an isovalue curve for M passing through F's 
equilibrium point A has a slope equal to -5. This is shown 
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simply by mUltiplying both sides of equation (s) by sand 
using the amounts of m and m which maximize value for F. x p 
As the share given to M approaches one, the difference 
between optimal choices for M and F are reduced. Thus, as 
the mate's share of household goods gets larger, the mate is 
less likely to misbehave. Here misbehavior has no moral 
content and only implies behavior different from what the 
family prefers. If household goods are shared equally among 
family members, 'this implies that members of larger 
households have greater temptation to misbehave. Large 
families are therefore more likely to impose rigorous 
enforcement methods rather than permitting voluntary 
compliance with desired behavior. 1. 
The difference in preferences between time inputs chosen 
by F for M and those chosen by M for M is also influenced by 
the convexity of the isovalue function, the degree to which 
: 
the marginal rate of substitution between time inputs 
diminishes. The equilibrium for M (point C) is always 
between points A and C in Figure 2. As the isovalue 
functions become more convex, the range of equilibrium 
points for M, and thus the difference between equilibrium 
points for M and F, decreases. 15 
14Both Becker [2, p. 32] and Pollak [8] discuss the cost 
of organizing a larger household. 
15This assumes no unusual functional forms. A 
sufficient condition for the conclusion to hold is 
homothetfcity--functions lie along straight-line expansion 
paths from the origin. Isovalue functions for M ordinarily 
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The important component determining convexity of the 
isovalue function is the degree to which M can substitute 
time inputs between own and household production. If time 
inputs are easily substituted, the isovalue function has a 
relatively flat slope, and M has relatively greater 
incentive to misbehave. 
For example, M's time is readily substitutable if it is 
used to earn wages, in turn used to purchase either own- or 
household goods. In this case, it is easy to substitute 
time (income) between own and household goods. M is tempted 
to keep earned income since M only gets back a share of 
income given to the production of household goods. The 
implication here is that families find it more costly to 
enforce appropriate member behavior when production is 
characterized by widespread use of wage labor outside the 
household. 
Individuals are less tempted to misbehave if own 
productio~ time is difficult to substitute for household 
production time. If own and household production are highly 
specialized, substitution is difficult. Specialized here 
means. sharply diminishing marginal value products of one or 
more of the time inputs. This is more likely when own and 
household activities are distinctly different. 
should have the same shape as those that F chooses for M, 
but be displaced by the amount of the share. 
15 
v. Household Public Goods 
Some goods produced by the family may' be "public" goods 
in that they are consumed jointly by family members. 
Consumption by one member does not affect the quantity 
available for others. These goods are termed household 
public goods because they are not available outside the 
family. 
A family's house has characteristics of such a good • 
. Once built (and ignoring congestion) the building's shelter 
is available to all members. Other examples include family 
entertainment (television?), some of the joys of children, 
education, and security. 
Introduction of household public goods only slightly 
alters the model's implications. Let p* be the value to the 
family of the household public good (excluding M). p* is 
the appropriate sum of the demand "curves of family members. 
If the value to each family member is identical, P*=nP where 
n is family size (excluding M). The maximization problem 
for F is solved replacing (l-s)P with p* and replacing sP 
with P. First order conditions (d) and (e) become the 
following: 
X ax ( t) -X + = 0I 3amp 




These conditions in turn simplify to the following: 
(v) 
= -1 
Once again, F equates the marginal rate of substitution 
between time inputs for M to the slope of the time budget 
line. Because the value of the household public good is 
mUltiplied by the number of family members, the household 
public good is relatively more valuable than the ordinary 
household good. For this reason, the family wants M to 
devote more time to household production than in the simple 
case. Given values in the- simple case, the denominator in 
condition (v) is l~rger than ~n condition (j). To achieve 
equilibrium, the numerator must become larger and the 
denominator must be smaller. This occurs if M's time is 
transferred from own to household production. 
As in the simple case, M has incentive to misbehave. 
Solving M's maximization using P for sP and manipulating the 








Again, the values for equilibrium imply that M would 
choose less time for production of household goods than 
preferred by the family in condition (v). This is not a 
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surprising result. M still receives only a fraction (l/n)P* 
of the family's value of the household public good and so is 
less inclined to spend time producing it than the family 
prefers. 
This is not to say that the presence of household public 
goods has no effect on the family. In fact, families where 
household public goods are important should have more 
members than other families. Under ordinary production, the 
marginal value to the family of an additional member is the 
production of that member less opportunity cost. with 
household public goods, the value of an additional member is 
the production of that member multiplied by the number of 
members less the same opportunity cost as in the ordinary 
case. Since additional family members are relatively more 
valuable, family should be larger. 1 ' 
Although the family has incentive to increase family 
size in the presence of household goods, an increase in 
family size also i~creases the tendency of the mate to 
misbehave. A larger family means a greater difference 
between M's and F's preferences. As Pollak recognizes, an 
important constr?int on family size is the increasing cost 
of enforcing appropriate family member behavior. 
l'Pollak [8] shows how families are larger when 
organizing family production is relatively easy. Becker [2] 
explains how family size is influenced by various economic 
factors. These and other authors have not explicitly
recognized that family size may be influence by the extent 
of household public goods. 
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VI • Love 
To this point, the model of behavior in a marriage 
treats participants as selfish individuals interested only 
in increased consumption of own and the share of household 
goods. The model shows how self-interest can cause behavior 
desired by a family to diverge from that preferred by a 
mate. However, at least during the last century in the 
western world, couples are widely held to marry for reasons 
other than self-interest, the most important being marriage 
·for love. 
Economists have a simple technique to introduce love and 
caring into individual decision-making. Let the utility of 
M depend in part on the utility of F: um=um(own goods, 
household goods, Uf ).17 For now ignore the possibility that 
F also loves M. Conve~ting the utility function to the 
value (inverse demand) functions used in this model, M value 
becomes the following: 
e is a function which converts value received by F to 
value received by M. Since value to F increases value to M, 
aS/avf>o. The value function for F remains the same as 
17Clearly M continues to maximize own happiness and so 
might still be considered to be motivated by self-interest. 
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before: Vf = (l-s)P+Y. Given the constraint on M's time, 
M's maximization equation becomes the following: 
( y)	 v = sP + X + 8(Vf ) - A(m +m -M)m	 p x 
Excluding the constraint equations, the first order 
conditions are the following: 
aV(z)	 m = ax - A = 0 
am amx x 
aV(aa) m = sap + as (l-s)..2..P- - A = 0 
amp amp aVf amp 







As before, M equates the marginal rate of substitution 
between time inputs to the slope of the time budget line. 
If M doesn't care about F, aS/avf=O and the ratio simplifies 
to that given previously in equation (s). Without love, M 
is inclined to misbehave by devoting less time to household 
production than is preferred by the family. By contrast, if 
M does care for F, the desire by M to misbehave can be 
reduced or even eliminated. 
Consider the case where ae/aVf=l, that is, where M is 
indifferent between a dollar in value received by M or by F. 
20
 
Becker [3] terms this situation "full caring".l' The 
denominator of (bb) simplifies to aP/am and the resultingp 
equilibrium is identical to that preferred by F in equation 
(j). If a mate considers own value to be the same as family 
value, the mate has no ·desire to misbehave. 
"Full" caring is only one case, of course. If M cares 
less than fully about the family, aS/aVf<l. Here M's 
equilibrium response is between no caring and full caring 
since the slope of the equilibrium condition lies between 
those given by the extreme conditions (j) and (s). The 
selfish desire to misbehave is tempered somewhat by love for 
the family. If M considers own value of less importance 
than_family value, ae/aVf>l.· In this case, M is inclined to 
misbehave by devoting too much time to production of 
household goods. This latter case is likely less serious 
since policing problems are not as important. 
VII. Family Love 
Love makes a mate behave differently. Does love alter a 
family's preferences about a mate's behavior? 
Interestingly, the answer is no, with a single exception. 
Even without love, the family has always had to implicitly 
llBecker recognizes the importance of love and caring in 
reducing the cost of enforcing appropriate family member 
behavior but does not outline the specific effects on the 
temptation to misbehave. 
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consider value received by the mate. The family is 
constrained to assure that M receives income at least equal 
to the best alternative. Thus, F's value has always 
depend~d on M's value, and thus the addition of love has no 
effect on preferred allocation of time. 
To show this, let the value function for F include a 
function ~(Vm) wh~ch converts value to M to value to F. l ' 
Include this function in F's previous constrained 
maximization equation (b). The relevant first order 
conditions become the following: 
(cc) aVf = aspM.... + aS A = 0 3 
as az aV azm
 
aVf
(dd) a~ ax ax A= - Al + = 03 
am aV am amx m x x
 
aVf
(ee) a~ .2.L ap= s + (l-s)­
amp aVm amp amp
 
- + s~A = 0Al 3 
amp 
Again, conditions (dd) and (ee) can be rearranged into 
an equilibrium condition with the following form: 
l'The functions ~ and e may also be functions of the 




(ff) ax [a4- + A ]
3 = -1 
arnx aV m 
1f-[sa4- + ap+ A - 113 
aVamp ampm 
Assume the constraint on M's alternative income is 
binding and so A3>0. Notice from condition (cc), so long as 
sand P are positive, a4-/aV +A3=l. Now assume that F cares m
for M less than fully so that a4-/aV <l. Under these m 
circumstances, condition (ff) simplifies to condition (j). 
Love has no affect on the allocation of M's time F prefers. 
Upon reflection, this is a reasona~le result. If F only 
"partly" loves M and M'S income constraint is binding, the 
income constraint is more important than the love. One 
dollar of additional income to M means one less dollar to F 
: and the value of the dollar lost to F is worth more to F 
than the dollar in value gained by M. Thus the income 
constraint rules F's behavior and desired allocation of time 
is unaffected by love. 
With partial love and a non-binding constraint on M's 
income, the result is somewhat different. Equilibrium 







Without love and with a non-binding constraint on M's 
income, F exploits M but still requirs that M allocate time 
the same as with the binding constraint. When F partly 
loves M, the feelings toward M alter the desired allocation 
of M's time. In condition (gg) starting from the allocation 
of time given before, returning to equilibrium requires that 
the numerator of (gg) be bigger because ax/am is· multipliedx 
by the fraction a~/aVm representing partial love. Thus 
equilibrium requires M to give" more time to production of 
own goods and less to production of household goods. 
Examination of first order condition (cc) shows that M 
is still given no share of household goods, however. 
Solving condition (cc) with A3=0 and rearranging terms 
yields the following: 
(hh)	 asp[a~ _ 1] = 0 
az aVm 
The term in parenthesis is negative because a~/avm<l. 
If P¢O, then as/az=o. For a maximum, the second derivative 
of (cc) must be less than zero and so s' '>0. This occurs 
when z=O and s=O. Thus, even with partial love, Fallows M 
no share of household goods. M must be consoled by being 
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allowed more time for production of own goods than without 
love. 
Interestingly, full love has no effect on the desired 
allocation of M's time. With full love, a~/oVm=l and from 
condition (cc) A3=0.20 The equilibrium condition again 
simplifies to (j). 
With greater than full love o~/aVm>l. For equation (cc) 
to hold, A3<0. If this is so, the alternative income 
constraint is not binding and the first order conditions are 
solved by setting A3=0.21 Doing so once again means that 
condition (cc) simplifies to condition (j). 
Although full love has no effect on the choice of time 
inputs, it does affect the distribution of household goods. 
Looking at equation (hh), the term in parenthesis is now 
greater than one because o~/oVm>l. Once again, so long as 
P~O, os/oz=O. For a maximum, the second derivative of (hh) 
must be less than zero, so s' '<0. This is true when z=l and 
s=l. With greater than full love allocation of time is not 
altered but F gives all household goods to M. 
To summarize. Love reduces the desire of a mate to 
misbehave by giving less time to production of household 
goods than is preferred by the family. "Full caring," where 
value to the mate is equal to value received by the family, 
2°F may still pay M the alternative income, but F does 
not feel constrained by this since dollars transferred to M 
have no affect on F's value. 
21This means F is permitted to pay ~ than the 





eliminates misbehavior. Too much love also tempts a mate to 
misbehave, although this is arguably a less serious problem. 
In general, a family which loves a mate has the same 
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